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1 Introduction
The 2008/2009 global financial crisis and its severe economic repercussions highlighted once
again the importance of financial stability surveillance. However, monitoring and assessing
national and international financial system soundness in a timely manner is a wide and com-
plex field of work. There is no consensus aggregate indicator which can be used to gauge
financial system’s resilience to stress situations. Instead, vast research in finance has led to a
great variety of non-mutually exclusive financial stability indicators based on different theo-
retical and empirical grounds (see e.g. IMF (2009)).
This paper derives a market based indicator by estimating option implied risk neutral den-
sities (RNDs) from observed option prices. In contrast to balance sheet based indicators,
market based stability measures are inherently forward-looking and available at much higher
frequency (see e.g. Knaup (2011)). Assuming that markets are information efficient, prices
exhibit all available information concerning the future evolution of a firm’s value and, hence,
the analysis of market prices offers a very appealing way to evaluate a firm’s soundness.
While it can be argued to which extent asset markets are information efficient, empirical
studies emphasize that derivative markets offer transactional efficiencies over equity and
debt markets which expresses in a higher degree of information efficiency (see Swidler and
Wilcox (2002); Mayhew (1995)). The reasoning is that the high leverage of derivative prod-
ucts decreases the cost of speculation and portfolio insurance, which in turn can increase the
informational content of those markets. Further, a great advantage of option markets over
e.g. the market of the frequently used Credit Default Swaps (CDS) is that option markets
provide us with several equilibrium prices for just one underlying, such that one obtains a
more comprehensive view of investors’ expectations. Also, option markets are usually more
liquid and prices more widely available than for CDS, as they are exchange traded.
We use the so-called option implied Probability of Default (option iPoD) methodology to
derive time series of option based financial stability measures. The approach was suggested
in Capuano (2008) and numerically robustified as well as evaluated in Vilsmeier (2011). The
framework uses the cross entropy function in order to estimate the option implied RND
and allows for a probability mass point in the RND at a value of zero for the underlying.
This mass point can be interpreted as Probability of Default (PoD). As opposed to CDS-
or bond based PoD estimation approaches, our methodology has the substantial advantage
that it requires no assumptions for the recovery rate. Further, we do not need to assume any
stochastic process for our risk neutral pricing model, which is the basis for approaches like
Distance to Default and for the derivation of option based indicators like Implied Volatility.
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Using a non-parametric estimation procedure, our approach provides the entire option im-
plied RND from the observed option prices and is highly flexible regarding the functional
form of the implied distribution. We obtain a probability distribution for the future value of
the option’s underlying at time to maturity, which provides us with a comprehensive image
about the investors’ expectations and risk preferences.
There exists a large literature on RND estimations, differing by the statistical methods ap-
plied to extract the RND from the observed option prices (for an extensive overview see
Jackwerth (2004)). So far, though, RND estimates have not been applied to systematically
evaluate a specific firm’s soundness over a longer period of time; instead they were used for
short term applications like evaluations of option pricing models (e.g. Figlewski (2008)) or
testing market expectations around certain events (e.g. Capuano (2008); Melick and Thomas
(1997)). Possible reasons are that RNDs do not provide a unique and easy to interpret stabil-
ity measure and that their estimations are often plagued by limited sets of strikes, noisiness
and maturity dependence. Moreover, one faces high computational efforts, and numerical
instabilities of the statistical approach can make it difficult to obtain consistent RND esti-
mates over long periods of time.
Our empirical implementation of the option iPoD framework overcomes the described prob-
lems. We estimate RND- and, hence, PoD time series for 19 of the largest US banks and
financial institutions. The considered sample spans over eleven years from 2002 to the be-
ginning of 2012 and comprises the late consequences of the early 2000s recession, the first
financial turmoils in mid-2007, the world financial crisis of 2008/2009 as well as the reper-
cussions of the European sovereign debt crisis of 2011/2012. This leaves us with a unique
opportunity to evaluate our indicator’s properties and forecasting abilities in an environment
of huge macroeconomic distress and to compare it with more resilient periods as from 2004
to 2007.
In order to obtain the RND/PoD estimates, we use alternately five-, six-, and seven month
call option contracts. Subsequently, we remove the maturity dependence inherent in the
original time series by applying a non-parametric quantile regression approach to the pooled
PoDs. The time series of the maturity corrected PoDs are evaluated with regard to their
consistency and predictive power and their properties are compared to Credit Default Swap
Spreads (CDS)4. In this context, we derive an indicator for the systemic risk prevailing in the
US financial sector by applying a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to the firm specific
PoDs. Thereby, we isolate the systematic components from the idiosyncratic risks of each
bank. Further, for a more clear interpretation of the respective levels of CDS and PoDs, we
4In the following we will use the abbreviation CDS for the term Credit Default Swap Spreads.
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check and compare the indicators’ properties in relation to the systemic risk, to the most
resilient bank and to their own history.
Our results give evidence for the predictive/signalling power of the option iPoD methodology
with regard to crises periods and for its ability to identify financially vulnerable institutions
in a timely manner. We find that CDS and the option implied PoDs exhibit very similar
dynamics, but PoDs being superior to CDS in identifying the high risk banks prior to the
Lehman crisis in September 2008.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. We are the very first to empirically
apply the option iPoD framework to derive time series of RNDs/PoDs and, hence, are the
first that give a comprehensive empirical evaluation of that methodology. It is demonstrated
how the option iPoD methodology can be empirically implemented in order to get consistent,
smooth and maturity corrected PoDs. This was achieved by the appropriate choice of liquidi-
ty weights, the use of a suitable maturity cycle of option contracts and a refined option data
filtering technique. With the estimated PoDs we provide highly informative financial risk
indicators for the individual firms in our sample, and in addition we use them to derive an
indicator for the systemic risk of the overall US financial sector. Moreover, we give empirical
evidence for the high informational content of the option iPoD framework, which is shown to
be superior to the informational content of CDS. We stress that this is due to the fact that
for CDS differing and unknown recovery rates over firms and periods of time complicate the
interpretation of the levels of CDS, while iPoDs can be interpreted directly as they are equity
based. Finally, our approach provides a sound basis for multivariate financial risk analyses,
as the framework provides time series for firm specific PoDs jointly with the corresponding
asset distributions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the underlying
methodology of our empirical framework. This comprises mainly the entropy based estima-
tion of the RND and the PoD. This is followed by the description of the data used in our
analysis. Section 4 explains the empirical implementation of our approach on how to ob-
tain a stable and smooth time series of PoD- and RND estimates. The estimation results as
well as the comparisons with the CDS are presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 provides
concluding remarks and offers prospects for further research.
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2 Methodology
The statistical framework used in this paper was originally suggested by Capuano (2008). In
Vilsmeier (2011) a more stable objective function for the RND estimation and an alternative
PoD determination procedure were proposed. In this paper, we apply this version.
The idea of the framework is to allow for a probability mass point for a value of zero of the
stock S in the estimation of a stock option implied RND. A RND is a density function f (ST )
that describes the investors’ expectations regarding the value of the underlying at time to
maturity T , implied by the observed option prices for different strikes. In order to obtain a
RND one uses the continuous risk neutral pricing formula for a call option
CKi0 = e
−rT
∞∫
ST=Ki
(ST −Ki) f (ST )dST , i = 1 . . .B. (1)
The formula should be solved with respect to the unknown density f (ST ) for given option
prices CKi0 at different strikes Ki. Equation (1) states that the today’s observed option prices
must be equal to the discounted expectation of the inner values5 under risk neutral prob-
ability measure (risk neutral pricing), where r denotes the annualized risk free rate and T
the time to maturity of the option (measured in years). The number of observable option
prices for different strikes K is denoted by B whereat the current stock price S0 is included
as an option with strike K1 = 0. One faces an underdetermined estimation problem, as we
do not have an infinite set of strikes (Breeden and Litzenberger (1978)). There are different
statistical approaches to determine a unique density f ∗(ST ) out of the infinite many that
are compatible with the observed prices (see e.g. Jackwerth (2004)). The approach chosen in
this paper is to minimize the so-called cross entropy function
CE[ f (ST ), f 0(ST )] =
∞∫
0
f (ST ) log
f (ST )
f 0(ST )
dST , (2)
under restrictions imposed on the moments of f (ST ) given by the system of equations (1)
and where f 0(ST ) denotes some prior distribution.
The cross entropy function is based on the concept of entropy, whose mathematical repre-
sentation is: H[ f (ST )] =−
∫ ∞
0 f (ST ) log f (ST )dST . In its information theoretic interpretation
of Shannon (1948), the entropy function can be regarded as a measure of average uncer-
tainty in a random variable. In this sense, if the entropy function is maximized subject to
5An inner value of an option is the payoff of the option given a specific realisation of ST .
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moment constraints on the density, among all densities that are consistent with the moment
conditions (1) one identifies this distribution as optimal that implies the most uncertainty re-
garding a future outcome (Jaynes (1957)). Without constraints the entropy function obtains
its maximum on a bounded domain by choosing the uniform distribution, for an unbounded
positive real valued domain (for a given mean) by the exponential distribution, and for an
unbounded real valued interval (given a mean and a variance) by the the normal distribution.
However, in this framework instead of maximizing the entropy function we minimize the cross
entropy function in order to identify an optimal density under moment conditions. Thereby,
the so-called entropic distance of f (ST ) to some prior density f 0(ST ) is minimized (see e.g.
Cover and Thomas (2006)). Both approaches, though, yield the same optimal solution, if the
prior distribution f 0(ST ) in (2) is chosen to be of maximal entropy on the defined domain.
We use the cross entropy concept since the prior density, f 0(ST ), is necessary for the deter-
mination of the PoD.
If one assumes that a stock price of zero implies default, then a probability mass point for
ST = 0 in the RND could be interpreted as the investors’ expectation regarding a firm’s
default between now and time to maturity T of the option. Given our continuous estimation
framework, such a mass point cannot be estimated as a ‘jump’ in the density at ST = 0.
Instead, we extend the domain of the RND for ST such that all realisations within this
additional interval of values imply a future stock price of zero. In this way the PoD is not es-
timated as a mass point but as the integral over the density assigned to a certain sub-domain
of the RND. The additional interval of values is obtained by shifting the domain for the fu-
ture stock value ST upwards by some constant D, and estimating f (VT ), with VT = ST +D.
For the payoff of the option in T (the inner value) now holds: CT = max(VT −D−K;0), and
any value VT ≤ D will imply an inner value of zero for arbitrary K.6 The integral of f (VT )
over the interval [0;D] will yield our PoD estimate.
A theoretical interpretation to the described PoD estimation procedure is possible, if one
assumes that the so-called structural approach of Merton (1974) applies to a firm’s balance
sheet. In the structural approach a firm’s value of assets is given by the value of its debt plus
the value of its equity. The firm defaults if the value of assets does not cover the value of
debt. Hence, in the PoD mechanism VT can be interpreted as value of assets, ST as the value
of equity and D as the value of debt.7
In Vilsmeier (2011) some important characteristics of the PoD mechanism were found using
6Note that before extending the domain of ST only ST = 0 implied an inner value of zero for arbitrary K.
7Note that the assumptions of the structural approach have no implications for the PoD estimation. Any
event that will lead in the investors’ expectation to ST = 0 will increase the PoD.
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numerical experiments. First, the procedure can perfectly estimate a probability mass point
for ST = 0 if the length of the interval D is chosen correctly. Second, the estimated PoD is
a concavely increasing function in D and flattens out after reaching the optimal D. Third,
for arbitrary reasonable RND forms and PoD levels the optimal D lies within the interval
[0;20]. Fourth, as an exact rule for the determination of the optimal D could not be detected,
averaging the PoDs obtained for RND estimates with Ds ranging from 0 to 20 provides very
accurate estimates. The optimal RND is then identified as the one that provides the PoD
closest to the average PoD (‘averaging approach’). Despite its quite ad hoc nature, this pro-
cedure produces highly accurate estimates in numerical experiments covering a great number
of reasonable RND/PoD specifications. As will be seen in section 5 the procedure produces
also highly plausible results if applied to real option data.8
For the RND estimation we use the following system of equations, which we express in terms
of VT and D:
CE[ f (VT ), f 0(VT )] =
∞∫
0
f (VT ) log
f (VT )
f 0(VT )
dVT (3)
CKi0 = e
−rT
∞∫
VT=D+Ki
(VT −D−Ki) f (VT )dVT , i = 1 . . .B (4)
∞∫
VT=0
f (VT )dVT = 1. (5)
(3) is the cross entropy function for f (VT ) with regard to some prior distribution f 0(VT ).
(4) denotes the continuous risk neutral pricing formula and (5) is an additional moment
condition that ensures that the density integrates up to one.
Combining (3) to (5), the estimation setup can be written using the Lagrange multiplier
8The intuition behind the ad hoc procedure is explained in Vilsmeier (2011). A sketch of the intuition
is as follows. The absolute level of D does not influence the results regarding the estimated RND/PoD but
only the value of Vmin (minimal possible realisation for VT ) relative to D, i.e. the interval length [Vmin,D].
The ’location’ of the interval [Vmin,Vmax] does not influence the results as the inner values of the options
depend on (VT −D), and D will increase by the same amount as VT if we move the interval. The length
of the interval [D,Vmax] does not significantly influence the PoD, as the normalization constant µ(λ ) will
offset the decreasing f 0(VT ) in the PoD estimation due to an increase in Vmax, and ‘irrelevant’ VT will be
assigned a density of virtually zero in the RND estimation. Hence, for the PoD/RND estimation only the
interval [Vmin,D] is of importance, which is addressed in the ad hoc procedure. Moreover, the non-parametric
estimation framework is able to estimate arbitrary levels of PoDs for relatively short interval lengths because
the framework assigns just enough density to values VT larger but very close to D that in the ‘transition’,
VT = D, the density is large enough to assign the PoD to the given interval length [Vmin,D]. This is because,
if e.g. the PoD is high, the framework has to assign density to values of VT that do not contribute to the
price of the option (very small values and ‘negative’ equity values).
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approach:
L =
∞∫
VT=0
f (VT )
[
log
f (VT )
f 0(VT )
]
dVT +λ0
1− ∞∫
VT=0
f (VT )dVT

+
B
∑
i=1
λi
CKi0 − e−rT ∞∫
VT=D+Ki
(VT −D−Ki) f (VT )dVT
 . (6)
Optimizing (6) with respect to f (VT ) yields (see e.g. Cover and Thomas (2006)):
f ∗(VT ) =
1
µ(λ )
f 0(VT )exp
[
B
∑
i=1
λie−rT1VT>D+Ki(VT −D−Ki)
]
, (7)
with
µ(λ ) = exp(1−λ0) = exp(−λ ′0) =
∞∫
VT=0
f 0(VT )exp
[
B
∑
i=1
λie−rT1VT>D+Ki(VT −D−Ki)
]
dVT . (8)
We see from (7) that the optimal solution will be in the family of exponential distributions.
Hence, the estimation procedure is highly flexible regarding the underlying shape of the RNDs
and is able to approximate almost arbitrary functional forms if we have enough option prices.
Further, the estimated PoD will be equal to
∫ D
0
f 0(VT )
µ(λ ) as the expression in the exponential
function will be equal to 0 for all VT ≤D. That means that the estimated PoD and the shape
of the RND interact, as the Lagrange multipliers also determine the shape of the RND.
If we assume some value for D, we obtain our RND and PoD if we are able to determine
the λi in (7). This could be achieved if one replaces f (VT ) in the Lagrangian by (7), and
optimizes regarding the λi. The resulting system of equations could be solved using e.g. a
multivariate Newton-Raphson algorithm. The search for the roots, though, is numerically
very unstable due to near singularities of the involved Jacobian for large domains of the λi.
Hence, in Vilsmeier (2011), following the suggestions in Alhassid et al. (1978) and Agmon
et al. (1979), an objective function for the λi was derived that yields efficient and numerically
stable optimizations. The derivation is based on the finding that a function can be defined
such that for any trial set of parameters λTr it provides a theoretical lower bound to the
value of the cross entropy of the optimal density. This function has its minimum for the
optimal set of λ s.
If one assumes some finite maximum and minimum value, Vmax and Vmin, for the value of
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assets (per share) in the RND domain9 and a uniform prior, one can solve the integrals
involved in the objective function analytically and obtains:
F = log
(
1
Vmax−Vmin
)
+ log
{
exp
(
−
B
∑
i=1
wiλiCKi0
)
(D−Vmin)
−
B−1
∑
i=1
exp
(
∑ij=1w jλ j(e−rT (Ki−K j)−C
K j
0 )−∑Bk=i+1wkλkCKk0
)
e−rT (∑ij=1w jλ j)
−
exp
(
∑ij=1w jλ j(e−rT (Ki+1−K j)−C
K j
0 )−∑Bk=i+1wkλkCKk0
)
e−rT (∑ij=1w jλ j)

−
exp
(
∑Bj=1w jλ j(e−rT (KB−K j)−CK j0
)
− exp
(
∑Bj=1w jλ j(e−rT (Vmax−D−K j)−CK j0
)
e−rT (∑Bj=1w jλ j)
 ,
(9)
where wi denotes weights that are pre-multiplied to the Lagrange multiplier. The weights
will ensure that more liquid option contracts (measured in our approach in terms of open
interest) have to be met more closely by the estimated RND. The assignment of the liquidity
weights is very important in order to obtain timely consistent and smooth PoD estimates.
This issue will be addressed in section 4. The minimization of (9) is numerically highly stable
and can be computed in a fast manner, which is prerequisite for our applications as we had
to estimate in total about one million RNDs based on options that provide up to 40 strikes
a day.
3 Data
Our option and stock data sample comprises 19 US banks and financial institutions and
ranges from February 6, 2002 to February 24, 2012. Hence, the late consequences of the
early 2000s recession, the first financial turmoils in mid-2007, the world financial crisis of
2008/2009 as well as the repercussions of the European sovereign debt crisis of 2011/2012 are
included in our data set. Regarding the level and variance in the degree of financial distress,
this data sample provides us with a unique opportunity to evaluate our indicator’s properties
9The value of Vmax should be large (e.g. ten times the current stock price) but can be arbitrarily chosen
as it does not significantly influence the estimates. Vmin denotes the minimal possible realisation for VT and
is set equal to zero in our applications.
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over a highly diversified period of time. As Coffinet et al. (2010) point out, prior to the world
financial crisis empirical literature assessing properties of market indicators had to rely on
rather soft definitions of default.
Among the 19 covered financial institutions there are 14 banks, namely: Goldman Sachs (GS),
Wells Fargo (WFC), Citigroup (C), Bank of America (BAC), JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Mor-
gan Stanley (MS), PNC Bank (PNC), State Street (STT), Bank of New York Mellon (BK),
Lehman Brothers (LEH), Bear Stearns (BSC), Wachovia (WB), Merill Lynch (MER) and
Washington Mutual (WM).10 This data set comprises the past and/or present largest US
banks. For instance, on November 4, 2011 the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published a
list of global systemically important financial institutions, which included the following US
banks: GS, WFC, C, BAC, JPM, MS, STT and BK (see FSB (2011)). Thus, our sample can
be viewed as an appropriate proxy for the US financial sector. Moreover, banks not covered
by the FSB listing had a major impact on the US financial sector before the outbreak of
the global financial crisis. LEH, for instance, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on
September 15, 2008; BSC was sold to JPM on March 16, 2008; MER was purchased by BAC
on September 14, 2008; WB was sold to WFC on December 31, 2008 and WM filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 26, 2008 and was shortly after taken over
mainly by JPM.11 LEH, BSC and MER were among the world’s leading investment banks
and prior to the financial crisis WM was one of the largest US banks.
In addition to the mentioned 14 banks, our sample includes 5 non-banking financial entities
with great relevance for the overall US financial sector. The American International Group
(AIG) is among the biggest insurance corporations in the world but had to be rescued by
the Federal Reserve Bank and the United States Treasury in September 2008 and May 2009.
Until its acquisition by BAC on July 1, 2008, Countrywide (CFC) was one of the largest
US mortgage banks. Before the financial crisis, the financial services company MBIA (MBI)
was the world’s largest monoline insurer and highly involved in the market of asset-backed-
and mortgage-backed securities. Blackstone (BX) is an asset management and financial ser-
vices company and currently the largest fund of hedge funds in the world. Finally, Blackrock
(BLK) is an investment management corporation and the world’s largest asset manager.
As can be seen from the brief discussion above, our data set covers not only a varied time
period but also includes a quite heterogeneous sample of financial institutions. Some have
performed quite well during the recent financial crisis, some others depended on governmen-
10We are well aware of the fact that a distinctive classification of the the financial entities is subjected to
certain inaccuracies due to the complexity of the underlying business portfolios.
11For the sake of completeness, also Citigroup had to be rescued by the US government on November
2008 but did not go bankrupt in the aftermath, though.
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tal financial aid during the turmoils and still others went bankrupt. This leaves us with a
substantial informational input for our empirical analysis.
The equity option and stock data of the above mentioned financial institutions were ob-
tained from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) via the data provider Stricknet. This
encompasses on a daily basis the end of day stock- and option price, the trading volume, the
strike price, the bid- and ask option price, the open interest (number of outstanding option
contracts) as well as the year, month and, for the current option symbol methodology, day
of expiration. At first, in order to estimate the option iPoDs we need to extract the relevant
information from our vast data set. This is a quite challenging task, due to the option market
inherent complexities and due to changes in the option symbolic system in February 2010.
The old option symbol format consisted of a three- to five-character symbol. The first up to
three letters denote the root symbol, which is the stock symbol of the respective company
if stock- and option trading is located at the same exchange. If not, it can depart. The sub-
sequent letter represents the expiration month of the option12 and indicates if it is a call
(letters A for January to L for December) or put (M to X). The last letter (generally A to
T) indicates the strike price. Since there are plenty potential strike prices but only a limited
number of letters, each letter stood for more than one strike price. Consequently, large stock
price variations may lead to duplications of the option symbols. Therefore, dummy- or ex-
tension root symbols were introduced in order to accommodate the limitations of the original
symbol. In consequence, one and the same option can have different option symbols whose
detection is not straightforward. The identification of option symbols is further complicated
by stock splits, odd strike prices and the proliferation of, for instance, LEAPs-, Quarterly-,
Weekly-, and FLEX options13. For an exemplary overview of such a dataset given the old op-
tion symbology see Table 1. Due to the mentioned shortcomings, a more intuitive and flexible
option coding system was established. The new symbology consists of a one to six character
root symbol, followed by two characters each representing the expiration year, month and
day, one character denoting the put (P) or call (C) option, five characters for the strike price
and three for possible strike price fractions (e.g. in case of stock splits). This option sym-
bolic method avoids any duplications and can accommodate newer types of options. For an
exemplary overview of our extracted dataset given the current option symbolic methodology
see Table 2. Most of our data, though, are based on the old option symbology. As a risk
12Note that specific expirations days have to be obtained from option expiration calenders. Equity options’
expiration date is usually every third Saturday in a month.
13LEAP stands for Long-Term Equity Anticipation Securities which are options with expiration dates
longer than one year. Quarterly options expire at the end of quarters and Weekly options expire after eight
days. FLEX options means Flexible Exchange Options which can be modified by investors needs.
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Option Symbol Last Volume Strike Bid Ask Open Interest Expiration Year
JPMRX 5.05 0 44.00 5.15 5.25 4149 2010
JPMRY 6.45 0 46.00 6.45 6.55 1210 2010
JPMRZ 7.00 0 47.00 7.15 7.25 1469 2010
JSAAA 25.55 0 17.50 24.15 24.25 1449 2010
JSAAB 34.45 0 10.00 31.65 31.75 92 2010
Table 1: Extract from the Option Dataset for JPM with old Option Symbology
Option Symbol Last Volume Strike Bid Ask Open Interest Expiration Year
JPM 110107C00042000 1.67 705 42.00 1.64 1.66 1125 2011
JPM 110107C00043000 0.89 2153 43.00 0.85 0.87 1279 2011
JPM 110107C00044000 0.34 4157 44.00 0.33 0.35 130 2011
JPM 110107C00045000 0.09 351 45.00 0.10 0.11 0 2011
JPM 110107C00046000 0.03 31 46.00 0.03 0.04 0 2011
JPM 110107C00047000 0.02 10 47.00 0.01 0.02 0 2011
Table 2: Extract from the Option Dataset for JPM with new Option Symbology
free interest rate we used the 3-month Treasury Bill secondary market rate obtained from
the FRED data base. The CDS spread data were obtained from Markit Group and range
from February 6, 2002 to January 18, 2012. The sample covers the same institutions as the
stock and option data, except for BK, BX and BLK. Due to enhanced data availability, we
extracted 5-year CDS under the credit event of modified restructuring.
The subsequent section will explain how we empirically implemented our estimation approach
and how we dealt with problems discussed in this section and the introduction.
4 Empirical Implementation
There are some important issues that have to be taken into account in order to be able to
estimate smooth and timely consistent RND time series.
The first issue concerns the so-called maturity dependence of RND estimates. RNDs provide
information about the expectation of investors regarding the value of the underlying at the
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expiry date of the option contracts. Hence, if one estimates RNDs for subsequent days and
uses option contracts with the same expiry date for each of these days, one faces the problem
that RNDs closer to the expiry date will exhibit ceteris paribus less uncertainty regarding the
future value of the underlying. This characteristic is called maturity dependence of RNDs.
The problem arises because traded option contracts exist only for a few expiry dates within
a year, such that one cannot extract time series of RNDs with constant time to maturity.
To solve this problem we introduce in section 5.1 a regression based procedure to remove
the maturity effects from the moments and PoDs of the estimated RNDs. For our procedure
to work, though, we need to keep the maturity effect between the estimated RNDs as small
as possible, i.e. the used option contracts for different days should exhibit similar time to
maturity. Very similar time to maturity would be obtained if one constantly uses option con-
tracts that expire in the subsequent month (as such a contract always exists). Thereby, the
maximum difference in time to maturity related to two RNDs would be 31 days. However,
this approach has the serious drawback that the estimated RNDs and hence PoDs only dis-
play information about the investors’ expectations regarding a very short time period. The
derived PoDs would indicate the probability of a firm’s default within the next few weeks
only, and the obtained results would be very erratic as only very imminent risks significantly
change the investors expectation. Consequently, one would wish for a risk evaluation for a
longer time period. Option contracts with longer time to maturity (e.g. 6 month) are not
newly initiated at each month, though. Instead, different firms have different cycles within
they initiate contracts with longer time to maturity than one month.
Taking into account the trade-off between maturity dependence and long term risk evalua-
tion, we identified and applied three different ’maturity cycles’ for our examined companies
and allocated institutions with the same maturity scheme into one group. Hence, in our
estimation implementation we considered three sub-samples of financial institutions instead
of treating all 19 institutions equally with regard to their maturity intervals. The first group
consists of GS, WFC, MS, BLK, BK, LEH, BSC, WB, MER, CFC and WM with, start-
ing in January, a cycle of six-, five- and seven month maturity (i.e. seven month contracts
are initiated in March, June, September and December), alternating throughout the years.
The second group uses a five-, seven- and six month maturity scheme and covers C, JPM
and BX. Finally, the third group comprises BAC, AIG, MBI, PNC and STT and follows a
seven-, six- and five month time to maturity cycle. The explained five,- six- and seven month
time to maturity schemes leave us with a maximum of roughly 90 days of difference in time
to maturity between the applied option contracts. Thereby, over the entire considered time
period of 2583 days for which we estimated the RNDs, we obtain repeatedly RNDs with
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the same time to maturity. This is the prerequisite for our maturity dependence adjustment
procedure, which consists of regressing the pooled (over time and firms) moments and PoDs
of the RNDs on their respective time to maturity.
A further important issue that we detected in the estimation of our RND time series is the
use of adequate liquidity weights in the optimization procedure as shown in our objective
function (9). These weights ensure that more liquid option contracts, which presumably ex-
hibit more information about the future value of the underlying (prices with less noise), are
met more closely by our estimated RNDs than illiquid contracts. The weights are calculated
by dividing open interest (contracts traded in the past and not exercised or evened up yet)
for a specific strike by the sum of open interest over all available strikes for a firm’s stock
option. We found that the use of liquidity weights based on open interest leads to much
smoother and more consistent time series than the use of trading volume, as often suggested
in the literature. The reason is that crucial market information are discarded if the sample is
weighted by trading volume. As the currently observed price arises as a result of current and
past trading, a contemporaneous trading volume of zero does not necessarily imply such a
contract is illiquid and has no information about the investors’ expectations. Quite the con-
trary, if there is no trading today but there was high trading in the past (measured in open
interest), this means the contract is liquid but the investors’ expectations did not change
with respect to the previous day(s).
A third issue deals with the old option symbology used previous to February 2010. Under
the current option symbol methodology the expiration date of the option is directly inherent
in the symbol (as well as the information whether it is a call- or put option) and, hence, the
extraction of the correct option contracts from the whole firm specific domain is straight-
forward. However, the old option symbology causes some difficulties due to problems like
dummy- or extension root symbols as outlined in section 3. First, we need to identify the
option contracts with the appropriate maturity. Knowing that the second last letter (A to L
for call options) of the option symbol denotes the expiration month of the option, together
with information about the expiration year (provided by the NYSE in the dataset), we can
filter out the options with the adequate time to maturity. Second, we need to deal with the
issue of dummy symbols. Therefore, we check how many different option symbols are left in
our already filtered dataset and sort the strike prices belonging to each symbol in ascending
order. If there is just one option symbol left, we are done. Otherwise, we check if different
option symbol groups have different strike ranges. If the corresponding strike ranges do not
overlap, we combine these contracts as they contain differing information. If strike ranges
overlap, we chose that option symbol corresponding with the most strike prices. Otherwise
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we would discard a large set of information in cases where the available strike ranges exceed
the number of available letters which denote the respective strike price of an option.
Finally, we have to set some model parameters before we can carry out the RND estimations.
The framework described in section 2 is designed such that we can set global parameters
which are used for the RND estimations for all institutions and all periods. This is very
important in order to be able to estimate such a large number of RNDs. As pointed out in
Vilsmeier (2011) the level of D, i.e. our debt value, does not influence our estimation results
but only the length of the interval [Vmin;D]. This implies that no matter how large we set
D, if Vmin is always D minus some constant (e.g. 10), the obtained results are exactly the
same. Knowing this, we set our Vmin = 0 and D takes integer values 0 to 20 in the averaging
approach. For instance, in the first run D = 1, in the second D = 2 and so on, up to our
Dmax = 20. For Vmax, we choose some arbitrarily large value that will be large enough for the
asset value domain of all banks and for all time periods. In our implementation, we used
Vmax = 850, which implies that the asset value per share of a firm cannot exceed this value.
5 Results
This section will show that the empirical implementation of our estimation approach yields
consistent and plausible PoD estimates and we will compare their performance to established
indicators like CDS. Subsection 5.1 will stress that during institution specific high distress
times the levels of our PoD estimates are more reasonable in size than those of CDS. In that
context, the issue of recovery rates will be discussed and the superior informational content
of our iPoDs emphasized. Subsection 5.2 presents our derived systemic risk indicator which
measures the degree of distress of the overall financial sector. Finally, subsection 5.3 interprets
our financial stability indicator in relative terms and substantiates the finding that our iPods
are often better than CDS in identifying high risk institutions prior to incisive events.
Even though we focus on the PoD time series, it is important to note that the evaluation
of the PoDs implicitly evaluates also the entire RND. This is the case because the PoD is a
function of all RND shape parameters λi. Hence, no consistent and plausible PoDs can be
obtained if not a consistent and plausible RND is estimated.
5.1 Time Series of option iPoDs
Applying the option iPoD methodology as described in the previous sections provides us with
a RND estimate for each firm at each trading day in our sample period. Figure 1 displays an
14
example of such a RND, obtained for Goldman Sachs at July 10, 2008. The special feature
of this RND estimate is the probability mass point for a future value of assets (per share),
VT , in the amount of the debt value D of the firm. The mass point indicates the probability
that the stock value of the firm will be zero at time to maturity of the options and hence
corresponds to our PoD estimate. We subsequently want to evaluate the time series of these
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Figure 1: Estimated Risk Neutral Density for the future value of assets (per share) for Gold-
man Sachs on basis of option prices available at July 10, 2008
PoD estimates obtained for the different financial institutions. Before we can do so, however,
we have to remove the maturity dependence from the daily PoD estimates, as outlined in
the preceding section.
The basic idea is quite simple. We start by pooling our PoDs over periods of time and
firms, and assign to each PoD estimate the time to maturity of the options that was used
to estimate the RND. Then we regress the PoDs on the respective time to maturity. As all
times to maturity run repeatedly from 130 days to 220 days, we have for each of the time
to maturities several PoD estimates such that the regression based approach should yield
rough approximations of the true maturity effects. In order to admit for non-linear matu-
rity effects as well as for different effects for different quantiles of the PoD distribution we
15
apply a non-parametric quantile regression approach. More precisely, we use the method-
ology of additive quantile regressions (Hastie and Tibshirani (1986); Hastie and Tibshirani
(1990)) in which the usual predictor of the quantile regression is augmented with additive
non-parametric terms, and smoothing restrictions are imposed onto the fitted function. As
smoothing restriction we apply the method of total variation regularization as suggested in
Koenker et al. (1994).14 Further, we restrict our fitted function to have a positive slope,
as we expect that a higher time to maturity leads on average to a higher PoD. Figure 11
(Appendix) exemplarily depicts for each time to maturity the 40%- and 90%-PoD quantiles,
as well as the respective fitted functions for each quantile. In order to carry out the maturity
correction, we obtain the fitted PoDs for each time to maturity and different quantiles (in 5%
steps), and calculate the difference between the fitted values of the highest time to maturity
and the respective lower time to maturities for each quantile. The obtained differences are
our correction factors for the estimated PoDs. The size of the correction factor applied to a
specific PoD depends on how large the assigned time to maturity is and to which quantile
the respective PoD belongs. After the correction all PoDs have a theoretical time to maturity
of 220 days that is the maximum possible time to maturity that we have in our sample.15
Figure 12 (Appendix) shows the effects of our maturity correction procedure on the original
PoD time series of Lehman Brothers. We can state that the maturity correction changes
nothing regarding the dynamics of the time series. PoDs are only systematically higher,
which is what we expect if time to maturity increases.
Henceforward, our aim is to check if the estimated PoD time series are plausible and consis-
tent regarding dynamic and level, and if the obtained indicators are able to give some early
warning signals in advance of crisis events.
In Figure 2 we see an example for an estimated time series of maturity corrected PoDs,
namely for Citigroup. The time series runs from February 2002 to February 2012 and dis-
plays some typical dynamics that one can find in the PoD time series of all institutes in
our sample (see Figure 13 (Appendix) for a complete overview of all PoDs). PoD levels are
elevated in the aftermath of the 2001 recession, followed by a very calm period with low
PoDs until mid-2007. Starting with July 2007, PoDs increase continuously until mid-2009 in
the course of the US subprime crisis. The bankruptcies of Bear Stearns (BSC) and Lehman
Brothers (LEH) are highlighted in Figure 2 and one can discover sharp inclines at the days
of these events but also highly elevated risk indication in advance of these events. In mid-
14The methodology is available in the statistical software R using the ‘quanteg’ package.
15The correction process could also be applied to different moments of the RNDs in order to obtain
maturity corrected densities.
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Figure 2: Time Series of maturity corrected PoDs in basis points for Citigroup from February
6, 2002 to February 24, 2012
2009, PoDs return to pre-LEH period levels and in end-2010/beginning-2011 even to levels
of the pre-BSC period. In August 2011 PoDs begin to increase again to pre-LEH levels as a
consequence of the European sovereign debt crisis.
Firm specific events for Citigroup are highlighted in Figure 2 with C I, C II and C III. C I
indicates the date when Citigroup was rescued by the US government, C II indicates the date
when large restructuring of the firm was decided at a general meeting, and C III the date
when Citigroup was downgraded by several rating agencies. For C I and C III we see that
the PoDs already signalled very high risks in advance of these events, with levels of around
1800 basis points (BP) for C I and 800 BP for C III. With regard to C II, the decisions
seemed to be expected (as PoDs decreased some days before) and once they were actually
made led to a sharp decline in investors’ risk perception. Added together, we see that the
PoD time series is able to signal risks concerning the entire financial sector (systemic risk)
as well as firm specific (idiosyncratic) risks in a timely manner.
To check our indicator’s predictive power in comparison to other existing indicators, we next
compare our PoD time series to 5-year CDS. CDS are a very commonly used measure to
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derive (risk neutral) probabilities of default for firms and countries, such that we cannot only
compare dynamics but also to some extent the levels of the two indicators.
In Figure 3, 5-year CDS for Citigroup are plotted against our PoD time series using two dif-
ferent scales. It is obvious that both indicators exhibit a very similar dynamic, i.e. the points
of time at which the time series move up or down are virtually the same. The impression that
both indicators, CDS and PoDs, exhibit highly similar dynamics is found for all of the time
series of the different institutions (see also Figure 4). In Table 3 (Appendix) the Pearson and
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Figure 3: Time series of maturity corrected PoDs versus time series of 5-year CDS for Citi-
group, using two different scales
Spearman correlations between CDS and PoDs for the different financial institutions can be
found. Correlations with CDS are calculated for maturity corrected and non-corrected PoDs,
respectively. After the correction Pearson correlations are on average about 3% higher than
before the correction, and are mostly around 70%. Spearman rank correlations are mostly
above 80% and remain in general unaffected by the correction. The size of the correlations
is extremely high, taking into account that CDS levels imply a default evaluation over one
year while our PoDs describe the possibility of default over six month on average. Compar-
ing Spearman and Pearson correlations indicates that there is some non-linear relationship
between PoDs and CDS which is not accounted for in the Pearson measure. The maturity
18
correction seems to linearise the relationship between the two measures to some degree as
Pearson correlations increase while Spearman correlations remain unchanged. The effect of
the correction is highly reasonable, as we would expect both indicators to exhibit perfect lin-
ear correlation (equal size) if there were not the issues of recovery rates (see below), differing
risk evaluation horizons and maturity dependence. These issues induce non-linearity to the
relationship, which can be accounted for by the Spearman measure but not by the Pearson
coefficient. Hence, removing the maturity dependence should increase Pearson correlations
and remain Spearman correlations unaffected. We conclude that the correlation analysis does
not only tell that PoDs and CDS exhibit quite similar dynamics, but also supports the ef-
fectiveness of our maturity correction.
An entirely different picture is obtained if we look at the levels of the PoDs and the CDS,
which differ considerably. This is a feature that is true for all of our PoD and CDS time
series, and is highlighted in an even more striking way in Figure 4, in which the PoD and
CDS time series for Lehman Brothers are plotted at the same scale. At the time of LEH’s
bankruptcy, PoD values rose to 2500 BP whereas CDS values rose only to 700 BP. This
feature is also shown in Figure 3 where at the time of the rescue of Citigroup by the US
government on November 23, 2008 (C I) we observe a level of around 4600 BP for the PoDs
versus around 250 BP for the CDS. Assuming we interpret the levels of both measures as
probabilities of default, the option implied PoDs are almost 18 times as high as CDS implied
PoDs in the Citigroup case and more than 3.5 times as high in the case of Lehman Brothers.
However, this interpretation is not entirely correct since CDS cannot be directly interpreted
as probabilities of default. In order to calculate CDS implied PoDs it is necessary to assume
some recovery rate (neglecting liquidity and counterparty risk) for the case of a firm’s de-
fault. This is because CDS are derivatives on debt based securities. In contrast, our option
implied PoDs can be interpreted directly as probabilities of default as we use equity based
market instruments. Hence, when comparing the levels of the two indicators one has to be
aware that if the investors’ assumed recovery rate is unequal to zero, a CDS spread implies
a probability of default of a multiple of its amount. This fact may lead to severe problems
in the assessment of the resilience of some firm, since an equal CDS level for two firms can
imply two totally different probabilities of default. Things are further complicated if recovery
rates are not constant over time. In contrast, our PoD estimates have the great advantage
that larger values of the indicator always imply higher risk, no matter if comparisons are
made over time, firms or both.
Taking into account the interpretation problem of the CDS levels, we subsequently make
the simplifying assumption that recovery rates are constant over firms and time in order to
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Figure 4: Time Series of maturity corrected PoDs versus time series of 5-year CDS for Lehman
Brothers, using one scale
be able to compare the indicated risk levels of CDS and PoDs. To compare CDS and PoD
levels it is first of all important to know what can be regarded as a high/low value for the
respective indicator. From Table 4 (Appendix) one can see that before the crisis (chosen
start date for crisis: July 2007) the average PoDs range from 2 BP for WFC to 29 BP for MS
and average CDS from 14 BP for BAC to 60 BP for MBI.16 PoDs are on average lower than
CDS spreads, which is due to the shorter implied default evaluation period. The average
values after July 2007 range for PoDs from 61 BP for GS to 1135 BP for MBI and for CDS
from 89 BP for PNC to 1162 BP for MBI. Knowing this, we can now assess that the PoDs’
observed maximum values for LEH of 2500 BP and for C of even 5800 BP are extraordinarily
high. In contrary, the maximal values of CDS for LEH of 700 BP and for C of 600 BP are
only about half as high as the average CDS value for MBI after the crisis. Given LEH and C
faced maximum financial distress at time of the respective maximum values, we obtain a first
indication that CDS level are less reasonable in size as option iPoDs. The possible reason for
the implausibility of the CDS levels might be that different recovery rates are assumed for
the different firms.
16Only taking into account those banks for which CDS and PoDs are available.
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Yet, the indicators’ average values alone do not provide us with a very clear picture on how
risky a specific firm is at a specific point in time. For this we need relative information. More
precisely, information on how large the level of a specific bank’s indicator is (i) relative to
the indicator level of other banks, (ii) relative to the level of a financially sound bank, and
(iii) relative to the bank’s indicator level in the past. In the following, we will focus on the
calculation and evaluation of these three ’relative’ risk indicators.
In the next section, we derive a new, systematic measure of financial risk, which we interpret
as a proxy for the systemic risk in the overall US financial sector and which we will use for
the first of our three relative risk indicators.
5.2 Systematic/Systemic Risk
Before we proceed with the discussion of the relative risk indicators, it is essential to clarify
what we exactly mean by the term systematic risk and how it is derived. As a result, we gain
a second type of indicator which, in contrast to our firm specific PoDs, signals the degree of
distress of the overall financial sector. This systematic risk indicator can serve as a comple-
mentary analysis tool for supervisory authorities. In addition, the new measure will allow us
to separate the common dynamic of all firms’ indicators from the individual indicator time
series. By doing so we can take into account the fact that all banks display historically high
indicator levels during crises periods and we can later identify those banks that are especially
risky, given the degree of distress in the entire banking sector.
Given the strong similarities in the dynamics of our PoD series (see Figure 13 in the Ap-
pendix), there is strong evidence for some latent factor that predominantly drives the pattern
of our dataset. We interpret this unobservable joint factor as systemic or financial sector risk.
In order to derive a measure for that financial sector risk component, we aim to segregate the
systematic risk of our PoD data from the banks’ individual idiosyncratic risks. Therefore, we
apply a principal component analysis (PCA) and regard the first principal component (PC)
as a proxy for the overall financial sector risk. In other words, the first PC represents that
joint factor which mainly causes the correlation between the variables and likewise explains
the largest part of the variation in the dataset and is therefore regarded as the driving force
behind the common pattern underlying our data.
Technically speaking, the first PC can be regarded as a linear combination of the optimally
weighted PoD data. Hence, our financial sector risk indicator is a weighted mean of our
banks’ PoDs. The term optimally refers to the fact that there exists no other set of weights
that leads to a PC which accounts for a larger amount of variance in the data. Thereby, we
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weigh these banks in the sample the most which exhibit the highest percentage of the total
variation and, hence, exert the strongest influence on the overall financial sector risk.
Due to data restrictions we could not use the complete set of banks to calculate our PCs.
For the PC of the PoDs we used GS, WFC, C, BAC, JPM, AIG, MS, MBI, PNC and STT.
No data are available for LEH, BSC, WB, MER, CFC and WM after their takeover or de-
fault and also BLK, BX and BK contain too many missing values. For the CDS we took
GS, WFC, C, BAC, AIG, MS and MBI for the same reasons just explained. Consequently,
given the data restrictions we decided to use the maximum number of companies available
for the respective PC calculation. We found that all eigenvector elements are positive and
that the first PC of our PoD data explains 79.21% of the total variation and the first PC of
the CDS explains 83.66% of the overall variance in the dataset. Given that high explanatory
power, we consider the first PC as an appropriate proxy for the systemic risk inherent in the
financial sector.
The PCs of our PoD and CDS series are depicted in Figure 5.17 It is striking that both
graphs exhibit highly similar dynamics but differ significantly in their level values - as al-
ready found for the individual bank PoDs and CDS. This shows again that our estimation
framework yields very plausible results. Regarding its predictive power, our systemic risk in-
dicator clearly indicates the late consequences of the early 2000s recession, the Bear Stearns
takeover by JPM on March 16, 2008 (denoted BSC in the graph), the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 (denoted LEH in the graph) as well as the worsening
conditions in the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis (labeled ESDC in the graph).
Our approach is very well capable to significantly predict incisive events in US economic
history on a sector wide scale and, moreover, indicates magnified distress levels even prior
to certain incidents.
Figure 15 (Appendix) shows that the above mentioned properties do not hinge on the exact
choice of banks used for the PC determination. In Figure 15, we used the same specification
of banks for the PC determination of the PoDs as used for the PC calculation of the CDS.18
One can clearly see that the main findings remain unchanged.
17Beforehand, we tested our PoD and CDS series for unit roots (results available upon request). We found
that except for the ’crisis banks’ which went bankcrupt or were taken over during 2008 (LEH, BSC, WB,
MER, CFC and WM), the series are significantly stationary. The crisis banks’ indicators, though, rose to
very high levels shortly before failure and then abruptly ended, hence, pointing towards unit root behaviour.
Nonetheless, theoretically it is hard to justify that the CDS and PoD series are non-stationary. If the series
were not mean-reverting, very high values lasting over a lengthy periode of time would sooner or later trigger
default of the respective company.
18The first PC of the PoD for a bank sample equal to the one used for the PC calculation of the CDS
explains 72.28% of the total variation in the data, which is still a very high percentage.
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Figure 5: Systemic risk of PoD and CDS series measured in basis points over the complete
sample
In order to have a closer look at the dynamics of our financial sector risk indicator, Figure
6 focuses solely on the crisis period. We highlighted important events during the financial
crisis in order to verify the predictive power of our financial sector risk indicator. BSC I
marks the Bear Stearns hedge fund troubles of mid-2007, which were the first forerunners
of the financial crisis. CFC I represents the announcement of the Countrywide takeover by
BAC on January 11, 2008, BSC II denotes the Bear Stearns takeover by JPM on March
16, 2008 and CFC II stands for the Countrywide acquisition by BAC on June 25, 2008. All
four events were accompanied by a significant increase in the systemic risk component of
our PoDs. More importantly, worsened financial conditions were signalled in advance to the
specified events. For instance, long before the CFC II event actually took place, the surge
in the systemic risk indicator already pointed to impending financial upheaval. The biggest
surge in the indicator took place in the course of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (LEH
event), the BAC announcement of the Merrill Lynch purchase on September 14, 2008 (MER
event) and the bailout of AIG by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on September
16, 2008 (AIG event). Shortly after the bankruptcy of Washington Mutual on September
23
Principal Components of PoD and CDS Series
 
 
 
0
 
69
6
13
93
20
89
27
86
34
82
Sy
st
em
ic 
Ri
sk
 C
om
po
ne
nt
 o
f P
o
D LEH, MER, AIG
BSC II
WB
WM
CFC I
CFC II
BSC I
 
 
 
0
 
30
9
 
61
9
 
92
8
12
38
15
47
Sy
st
em
ic 
Ri
sk
 C
om
po
ne
nt
 o
f C
DS
01/2007 04/2007 07/2007 10/2007 01/2008 04/2008 07/2008 10/2008 01/2009 04/2009
Time
Principal Component of PoD
Principal Component of CDS
Figure 6: Systemic risk of PoD and CDS series measured in basis points from January 2007
to April 2009
26, 2008 (WM event) as well as the announcement of the acquisition of Wachovia by WFC
on September 29, 2008 (WB event) market conditions further worsened as indicated by a
substantial increase in the systemic risk measure. Again, our financial sector risk indicator
rose sharply already prior to these incisive events.
Given the strong predictive power of our financial sector risk indicator, we are interested in
building an indicator which puts more emphasis on the relative intensity of distress in the
financial sector. Therefore, to classify the levels of the systemic risk component, we built
’crisis bands’ based on four pre-specified events. We took the 50 days average of our PoD
and CDS systemic risk components around the early 2000s recession (weakest crisis level),
prior to the BSC takeover by JPM (second weakest crisis level) and prior (second strongest
crisis level) as well as posterior (strongest crisis level) to the LEH bankruptcy. The four crisis
bands are depicted in Figure 16 (Appendix). Based on these crisis thresholds we construct
an ordinal scale which indicates on a five step interval the intensity of risk in the US financial
sector over time - yielding a scaled magnitude of systemic risk which helps to set current
crisis levels in relation to previous ones. That ordinal crisis scale is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Ordinal crisis indicators for the systemic risk of PoD and CDS series
Again, the dynamics between the PoD and CDS ordinal crisis indicators are highly similar.
At first, the indicator signals no crisis at all but soon jumps upon a step one crisis level,
associated with the early 2000s recession. This is followed by a relatively long non-crisis
period (crisis level zero) before the indicator starts to rise again, triggered by the BSC hedge
fund troubles. This initial surge sets in earlier for the PoDs compared to the CDS scale.
The ordinal indicator reaches its maximum at the point of the LEH bankruptcy and remains
at crisis level four during times of severest financial distress. Due to governmental stability
measures, conditions improved and crisis levels decline but never reach pre-crisis levels again.
The last surge in the ordinal scale indicates the European sovereign debt crisis.
5.3 Relative Risk Analysis
Relative to Systemic Risk
As we could verify that our proxy for the systemic risk component of the US financial sector
provides very conclusive results, we apply this financial sector indicator to our relative risk
analysis. Figure 8 depicts exemplarily the PoD and CDS series of LEH and WM relative to
the systemic risk. We consider a period of six months prior to the Lehman event in order to
25
evaluate the predictive power of our financial stability indicator in advance of severe events.
Therefore, we subtract the financial sector risk component from the original PoD and CDS
series of the respective companies and gain a ’relative risk spread’ measured in basis points.19
This spread indicates whether a company’s distress level is considered to be higher or lower
compared to the prevailing overall financial sector risk. The upper graph of Figure 8 exhibits
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Figure 8: PoD and CDS series relative to systemic risk six month prior to the Lehman event;
measured in basis points
the relative risk spread for the PoD and CDS series of LEH. As illustrated by the zero line,
the relative PoD time series moves constantly around zero but exceeds that value in July
2008, two and a half months before the actual collapse of LEH. Hence, way in advance of
the bankruptcy, our indicator is able to signal in relative terms an increased default risk.
One trading day before failure, the risk spread even rose to around 29.5%, implying a default
probability which is 29.5 percentage points higher than that of the average overall financial
sector. In contrast, the CDS spread remains negative over the complete sample, which im-
plies LEH’s distress level to be below the systemic one. This clearly underestimates LEH’s
inherent default risk especially with regard to the looming insolvency.
The lower graph of Figure 8 depicts the relative PoD and CDS time series for WM. Here,
19For the sake of consistency, for the systemic risk calculation we used in this case the same bank sample
for the PoDs as for the CDS. However, results remain unchanged if we used the PoD sample of section 5.2.
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both curves signal a relative risk level above the systemic one in the latter part of the sample,
which is plausible since WM collapsed on September 26, 2008. However, the PoD spreads are
positive over the complete sample, whereas the CDS curve does not cross the zero line before
the end of July 2008. This result speaks again in favor of the predictive power of our option
implied financial stability measure. In addition, the absolute values of the PoD spreads are
decisively higher than the CDS ones, which is more consistent with the strained financial
condition of WM at that time.
Table 5 (Appendix) provides an overview of the relative riskiness of the remaining financial
institutions in our sample. We aggregated the information by taking the average of the PoD
and CDS spreads for each institution over an interval of one to ten days, ten to twenty days,
twenty to forty days and thirty to sixty days prior to the Lehman event. The results sub-
stantiate the findings from above that our PoDs are superior to the CDS in identifying the
most financially troubled institutions already prior to the Lehman Brothers breakdown (see
highlighted LEH, WB, MER, WM and AIG). In a consistent manner, the PoD spreads of the
most resilient banks like GS, WFC and JPM exhibit negative spreads since these institutions
weathered the financial turmoils quite well.
Relative to the most resilient bank
It is important to consider that the derived systemic risk component used in the analysis
above can be mainly driven by one or a few high risk institutions. As a result, a bank’s risk
level below the systemic risk does not inevitably imply that this bank is riskless. Therefore,
we extend our analysis and set our PoDs and the CDS in relation to the most resilient bank.
As most stable bank we chose JPM for two reasons: First, PoD and CDS levels are the lowest
on average over the complete sample and second JPM has the fewest missing values for both
indicators.20 Figure 9 displays PoD and CDS series for LEH and AIG relative to JPM for
a period of six months prior to the Lehman event. In both graphs the PoD and CDS series
have a highly similar dynamic structure and spread values are almost exclusively positive.
Hence, the relative PoDs as well as the relative CDS point to an increased risk level prior
to the Lehman event. Moreover, in the case of LEH even the Bear Stearns crisis of March
2008 is characterized by amplified spread levels. The absolute magnitude of the spread levels,
though, differ to a large extent, implying that the PoDs signal a higher degree of distress.
This is highly reasonable given the grave financial conditions of both institutions.
In essence, these results are confirmed by Table 6 (Appendix). Again, we aggregated our PoD
20We tested several reasonable specification for the most resilient bank and found that the main results
do not hinge on the exact choice of JPM as most stable institution.
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PoD and CDS Series Relative to Most Resilient Bank: LEH
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Figure 9: PoD and CDS series relative to the most resilient bank (in both cases JPM) six
month prior to the Lehman event; measured in basis points
and CDS spread data for the relevant financial institutions prior to the Lehman event in the
same way as done in Table 5. As one would expect, beside very few values, all spreads are
positive. More interestingly, for banks like WM, MER, WB and LEH which did not survive
the financial crisis, the PoD spread values are consistently higher than the CDS spreads. The
capability of our PoDs to act as a financial early warning system prior to disruptive events
is thereby further demonstrated. Also institutions like AIG or C, which may have survived
the financial turmoils but underwent severe difficulties, are assigned higher spread values for
the PoDs than for the CDS.
Relative to the own history
For a complementary risk analysis one also needs to evaluate a bank’s performance in relation
to its own history. Especially, in calmer periods prior to financial turmoil spreads relative to
the most resilient bank and to the financial sector risk might be rather small. This is due
to the fact that investors’ risk perceptions do not diverge much in financially stable periods.
If for instance the two previously discussed relative risk indicators did not signal elevated
degrees of distress that would not inevitably imply that a bank’s financial condition has
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not worsened yet. Hence, a firm’s PoD relative to its own history can be regarded as a first
warning sign, whereas the indicators relative to the most stable bank and the systemic risk
follow with a lag.
Therefore, in Figure 10 we consider a period of six months prior to the Bear Stearns event
of March 14, 2008 (first takeover arrangements by JPM induced by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York), reflecting a rather tranquil financial environment. It is about to see if
our relative PoD series is able to identify the increasing risk emerging at the horizon. The
PoD and CDS spreads are determined by taking the difference between the original series
and its mean over a moving window of the last three years. As initial interval for our mean
calculation we chose January 2004 to January 2007. Figure 10 depicts the PoD and CDS
spreads for Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers relative to their own history. In both graphs,
PoD and CDS Series Relative to Own History: BSC
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Figure 10: PoD and CDS series relative to the own history six months prior to the Bear
Stearns event; measured in basis points
the PoD and CDS spreads exhibit highly similar dynamics and are also quite similar with
regard to the magnitude of their spread values. This is not very surprising since - as already
mentioned in section 5.1 - CDS and PoD levels are relatively close in financially solid periods.
More strikingly, the PoD as well as the CDS spreads for Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers
clearly indicate the Bear Stearns hedge fund crisis of mid 2007, which was the first signifier
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of the looming financial crisis. In the following, the spread series remain on their elevated
levels and surge shortly before the Bear Stearns event.
Table 7 (Appendix) aggregates the results for the remaining financial institutions of the
sample. This time, however, we chose different intervals for our mean calculation in order to
evaluate if and how the relative risk measures signal the different distress levels over time.
We took the mean over an interval of: 1 to 10 days (to capture the period close to the event),
30 to 136 days (September 2007 to February 2008 as the period between the hedge fund
crisis and the final event), 137 to 180 days (July 2007 to September 2007 as the period of
the hedge fund crisis itself) and 181 to 225 days (May 2007 to July 2007 to represent the
financially resilient period) prior to the Bear Stearns event.
Almost exclusively all institutions’ relative risk indicators rise over time. Starting from very
low and partly even negative values, all series increase to noticeable higher amounts in the
wake of the hedge fund crisis. The averaged spread values further rise which points to wors-
ening financial conditions prior to the Bear Stearns event. This is especially the case for WM
and CFC whereas spreads of more stable banks like GS and JPM increase only moderately.
BSC’s and LEH’s spread values also rose rather slightly which suggests that their collapse
came quite surprisingly relative to their own history. This involved not only investors from
equity- but also from debt markets. Shortly before the final event, almost all companies’
spreads increased sharply given that the moving window average already accounts for past
risen values. Hence, results presented in Table 7 are fully in line with economic events which
occurred at that time.
This section showed that also on a relative scale, our option implied financial stability indi-
cator provides plausible and consistent results, and gives proof of its high predictive power.
As consequence, these properties also speak in favor of our RND estimation procedure in
general.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we applied the so-called option iPoD methodology to a dataset of option prices
for 19 of the largest US financial institutions, ranging from February 2002 to February 2012.
We showed how to empirically implement the framework in order to obtain consistent and
smooth time series of option implied Probability of Defaults (PoDs). This was achieved by
the appropriate choice of liquidity weights, the use of a suitable maturity cycle of option
contracts and a refined option data filtering technique. The option implied PoDs are esti-
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mated as probability mass point for a future stock price of zero in a non-parametric risk
neutral density (RND) estimation framework. To obtain the time series of RND/PoD esti-
mates, alternately five-, six-, and seven month call option contracts were used. Subsequently,
maturity dependence in the time series was removed by applying a non-parametric quantile
regression approach to the pooled PoDs.
The time series of PoDs for the different financial institutions were comprehensively evaluated
regarding their plausibility and consistency in size and regarding their signalling/predictive
power in advance and during crises periods. To do so, we contrasted our indicators to his-
torical events and to time series of 5-year Credit Default Swap Spreads (CDS). We found
that the PoD estimates are very well capable to signal the occurrence of adverse shocks to
the financial sector as a whole as well as to specific financial institutions - in most cases
even way in advance of the actual events. Correlation analyses between 5-year CDS and the
option implied PoDs showed that both indicators exhibit highly similar dynamics and gave
strong indication for the effectiveness of our maturity dependence correction methodology.
Comparing the levels of CDS and PoDs, we found clearly differing values, PoDs being very
much larger in advance and during times of distress than CDS. However, in order to derive
CDS implied probability of defaults, recovery rates for the different firms and points of time
have to be assumed which in turn severely complicates the direct interpretation of the levels
of CDS as a risk measure. Hence, we stress the valuable advantage of the iPoD framework,
which provides crises indicators that can be interpreted in a direct way as (risk neutral)
probabilities of default and, hence, allows for a simple comparison of risk levels over firms
and points of time.
For a more clear interpretation of the respective levels of CDS and PoDs, we further calcu-
lated three different ’relative’ risk indicators. We analysed the spreads of the CDS/PoDs for
the different banks relative to the prevailing systematic risk in the financial sector, relative
to the risk of the most resilient bank in the sample, and relative to the respective bank’s
risk in the past (its own history). In this context, we calculated a proxy for the prevailing
systematic risk in the financial sector. Therefor, we applied a Principal Component Analy-
sis to the time series of PoDs/CDS. We identified that principal component with the most
explanatory power regarding the variation in the sample of the original time series as the
latent factor that drives the risk of all of the firms to some extent. The proxy provides a
self contained financial stability measure, that can be used to gauge the stability of the US
financial sector as a whole. In the analyses of the dynamics of the systematic risk component
we could confirm its high signalling and predictive power.
The evaluation of the relative risk indicators showed that the iPoD approach was able to
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identify the high risk banks in advance of the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy. In this context,
we could emphasize the clearly superior signalling/predictive power of the iPoDs compared
to CDS. During this period, the most informative signals were given by the spreads relative
to systematic risk, followed by those relative to the most resilient bank. The spreads relative
to its own history, in turn, clearly signalled the first turmoils in the course of the US sub-
prime crisis in mid-2007. This is true for the CDS and PoD derived relative indicators.
Finally, given the results from our comprehensive empirical analyses we stress that the op-
tion iPoD framework provides highly informative risk indicators, which in many cases are
superior to CDS with regard to its signalling/predictive power. Importantly, the amount
of information provided by the methodology is also superior to almost any commonly used
financial risk framework, since one does not only obtain PoDs, but at the same time the
corresponding (compatible) asset value distributions for the different firms over time. By
evaluating the plausibility/consistency of PoDs in the paper, we implicitly also evaluated
the plausibility/consistency of the respective asset distributions (RNDs), as the PoDs are
a function in the RND shape parameters. This makes the framework highly attractive for
multivariate risk analyses, in which joint PoDs and asset distributions of several banks are
derived. In the most straightforward way, such a approach could be implemented using the
entropy based Consistent Implied Multivariate Density Optimization (CIMDO) methodology
suggested by Segoviano (2006).
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Figure 11: 40%- and 90%-Quantile of the PoDs for different time to maturities and the re-
spective fitted functions
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